Is the Swedish central government a wage leader? This question is studied empirically in a vector error-correction model using a unique, high quality data set. Private sector salaries are found to be weakly exogenous to the system of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage leader in the long-run model. We also find that salaries in these two sectors do not converge to a common salary in the long-run and that changes in central government salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector salaries. Together, these findings clearly demonstrate that the central government is not placing undue pressure on salaries in the private sector. The central government is not acting as a wage leader.
Introduction
The Scandinavian countries have small, open economies. Their labor forces are highly unionized and they tend to have relatively large public sectors. This particular combination of characteristics creates a unique set of challenges to the wage formation process. The main challenge is how to set wages in the highly unionized, non-competitive sectors without placing undue pressure on the wage formation process in the competitive sectors, pressure that would ultimately put these sectors at a significant disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign competitors, particularly when exchange rates are fixed. 1 This problem has been widely recognized by politicians and trade union economists alike and was formalized in a number of economic models during the early 1970's. The Norwegian multi-sector price income model (Aukrust, 1970 (Aukrust, , 1977 , the Swedish EFO-model (Edgren, Faxén and Odhner, 1973) , and Finland's input-output framework (Halttunen and Molander, 1972) all address this problem explicitly. Collectively, these models are known as the Scandinavian model of inflation. The two main tenants of the Scandinavian model are; first, nominal wage changes in the competitive sector should be equal to the sum of productivity changes in the that sector plus changes in world prices and, second, that the competitive sector should act as the wage leader (i.e. wage increases should be transmitted from the competitive sector to the protected sector and not vice-versa). 2 In Sweden, the EFO-model has been used by a number of economists to evaluate the wage formation process ex post (see e.g. Jacobson and Ohlsson, 1994 and Friberg, 2003) . More importantly, it has acted as a set of normative guidelines for employers 1 If exchange rates are flexible, then upward pressure on wages in the competitive sector may result in currency depreciations. These automatic depreciations will increase exchange rate volatility. One could argue that there may be costs to doing business with a volatile exchange rate. Furthermore, total consumer welfare may go down by more than total producer welfare goes up when the exchange rate falls. 2 Wage leadership can also be derived from institutional, wage bargaining models and efficiency wage models (see e.g. Bemmels and Zaidi, 1990) . and trade union negotiators, even after Sweden abandoned its fixed exchange rate regime. The normative conclusions of the EFO-model have been officially adopted by the Swedish Agency for Government Employers (Arbetsgivarverket) and guides their wage setting policies (Elvander, 2004; Lindquist and Vilhelmsson, 2004) . The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not actual wage outcomes of central government employees are in line with this stated praxis. 3 We begin by presenting several institutional facts which may be relevant to the question at hand. First of all, central government wage agreements have, as a rule, been completed after wage agreements in the private sector have been signed (Holmlund and Ohlsson, 1992; Friberg, 2003; Elvander, 2004) . Second, according to the Framework Appropriations System (Ramanslagssystemet) adopted in 1994, central government salaries are supposed to be explicitly tied to wage bill increases (net of average productivity growth) in the competitive sector. Third, the average salary of a central government worker is lower than that of a white-collar worker in the private sector (see Figure 1) . Fourth, in 2002, the central government employed only 6 percent of all workers, while local government employed 28.5 percent and the private sector employed the remaining 65.5 percent. 4 Together, these facts makes it less likely that the central government has been acting as a wage leader.
5
A number of earlier studies concluded that the private sector was, in fact, the wage leader in Sweden (Holmlund and Ohlsson, 1992 This is done using a unique, high quality data set, which is presented in Section 2.
Unlike the previous studies by Holmlund and Ohlsson (1992) The empirical results of this paper are presented in Section 3. They are based on the estimation of a vector error-correction model using the Johansen maximum likelihood approach (see e.g. Johansen, 1995) . The methods used in this paper are similar to those used by Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994) . 8 We have three primary results. First, private sector salaries are found to be weakly 6 Mizala and Romaguera (1995) test for public sector wage leadership in Chile. They find that after the deregulation of the Chilean labor market (between 1979-1982) , the public sector lost its wage leading position. 7 Andersson and Isaksson (1997) also make this distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers, but there data set only goes up to 1995. Our updated data set allows us to consider the impact of the new Framework Appropriations System implemented in 1994 as well as the full impact of the move towards individual wage setting stipulated by the Framework Agreement (Ramavtal) which was put into place in 1990. 8 Our impression is that Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994) were the first to apply the Johansen methodology in a stringent manner to construct a serious test of the EFO-model. exogenous to the system of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage leader in the long-run model. Central government salaries adjust to changes in private sector salaries in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium relationship. Second, changes in central government salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector salaries. Changes in private sector salaries are determined by a deterministic trend (domestic inflation) and a stochastic trend (which we interpret in line with the EFOmodel as the sum of changes in exogenous productivity and changes in exogenous world prices). Third, we find that salaries in these two sectors do not converge to a common salary in the long-run. Together, these findings tell us that actual wage bargaining outcomes for central government workers are in line with the stated intentions of the Swedish Agency for Government Employers and that they are not placing undue pressure on the private sector market for white-collar workers. 9 
Data
We use two data series in this study: nominal monthly, white-collar salaries in the private sector, w ps t , and nominal monthly salaries in the central government, w cg t (see Figure 1 ). The data are annual time series from 1970 to 2002 collected by the 9 We believe that the results presented in Tägtström (2000) and Friberg (2003) are the product of unfortunate choices of methods and data. Tägtström applies a standard Granger causality test to nonstationary data. These tests are (at best) only approximately correct and demand the use of non-standard F-test statistics. They may not be valid at all (Charemza and Deadman, 1992) . Furthermore, when she tests for Granger causality using the data in first differences (i.e. using stationary data) these new, more correct tests show that the central government is not a wage leader.
Friberg (2003), on the other hand, uses methods similar to those employed in this paper and in Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994) . The main methodological shortcomings of his paper is that he does not perform joint tests of cointegration and model specification, nor does he consider the impact of including deterministic components on the distribution of his test statistics. Given the large number of alternative models that he presents (and an equally large number that he fails to address), the fact that he does not test for model specification means that he does not reject a number of misspecified models nor does he necessarily find the most appropriate model. At the end of the day, our inability to distinguish between alternative models makes his results unambiguous and difficult to use in practice. The Granger causality tests in his paper are also incomplete. They examine the impact of x on z, but ignore the impact that x might have on z through a third variable y.
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Svenskt Näringsliv) and the Swedish Agency
for Government Employers. They are based on actual contracts and cover nearly all workers in these two categories. There are three major advantages of using this data, as compared to the data used in earlier studies. First, and most importantly, since more than 95 percent of all central government workers are white-collar workers, and since these workers are covered by white-collar unions, negotiations and contracts, it seems only reasonable to examine the impact of central government wage formation on wages of white-collar workers in the private sector. Comparing central government wages to an aggregate of white-collar and blue-collar workers in the private sector may be grossly misleading.
Second, the wage data used in this study have been correctly periodicized. For example, retroactive wages have been book-kept as yesterday's wages, whereas in the wage data from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån) they are treated as today's wages. This type of periodicization is made possible by the fact that the data comes from employers with more precise knowledge about contracts and actual wages paid out.
Third, the two time series have been cleansed of between sector wage changes due to structural changes. This is necessary because a number of large government companies have been privatized during this time period, including; the postal service, the telephone company, the largest energy producer, the railroad track maintenance company, and even the Swedish Lutheran church. Such changes in the underlying structure of the two sectors have been controlled for when producing the time series.
Another important example is that primary and secondary school teachers are no longer central government employees. This has also been controlled for.
Pre-Testing the Data
Examining the time series for private sector, white-collar salaries and central government salaries in Figure 1 , we see that both variables are clearly nonstationary. When this is the case, it is important to investigate the nature of this nonstationarity. To do this, we pre-test each variable in order to determine its order of integration (i.e. the presence of one or more unit roots) and to test for the presence of deterministic trends. This is done using the augmented Dickey-Fuller sequential procedure outlined in Enders (2004) . The details of these tests can be seen in Appendix A.
The results of this sequential testing procedure are unambiguous. Both variables have a single unit root and are, hence, integrated of order one. Each of the variables also contains a quadratic deterministic trend which is due to the high level of inflation in Sweden during the 1970's and '80's. The fact that both variables are I(1) means that they are potentially cointegrated. A joint test for cointegration and the presence of a quadratic trend in the preferred model will be carried out below. The results from this test tell us that we can, in fact, use regression analysis to say something meaningful about the relationship between these two variables despite the fact that they are both nonstationary and include stochastic trends.
Estimating a Vector Error-Correction Model
The empirical results of this paper are based on the estimation of a vector errorcorrection (VEC) model using the Johansen maximum likelihood approach (see e.g. Johansen, 1995) . The VEC modelling strategy allows us to test for wage leadership in two distinct ways. First, we can examine if one of the variables included in the model is, in fact, weakly exogenous to the estimated system of equations. If two variables, X t and Y t , are cointegrated, and if the variable X t turns out to be weakly exogenous, while the variable Y t is not, then we know that the variable Y t adjusts to changes in the variable X t in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium. In this case, X t is the "leader" and Y t is the "follower". Second, the model allows us to construct a more robust test of Granger causality between ∆X t and ∆Y t . 10 One which does not suffer from the exclusion of a very important variable, namely, the long-run cointegrating relationship between X t and Y t .
We will also take advantage of the fact that a VEC model allows us to model both the short-and long-run relationship between white-collar salaries in theses two sectors. This allows us to test for the presence of salary convergence in the long-run and to examine the determinants of salary formation in the short-run.
Determining the Lag Length
The first step in building a well specified, vector error-correction model is to determine the number of lags, p, which should be included in the model. This is done by estimating an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR) model using the data 10 ∆x denotes the first difference of variable x.
in levels. 11 The VAR(p) model can be written as
where
A is a (2 × 2) matrix of regression coefficients and ε t is a (2 × 1) vector of Gaussian, white noise error terms. This VAR(p) system of equations can be viewed as a model in reduced form. When determining the lag length p our goal is to obtain a parsimonious representation of the model which, at the same time, includes a sufficient number of lagged x t s so as to glean out all information available from the ε t s concerning the structure of the relationship between the x t s. This means that our choice of p should be as minimal as possible, while, at the same time, we cannot allow non-normality, serial autocorrelation, or ARCH to appear in the residuals.
Following Enders (2004) we use multivariate generalizations of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to choose the
appropriate lag length, p. The principle behind these two tests is the same. We are punished for adding variables that do not contribute significantly to the model fit.
Oftentimes, these two test result in conflicting conclusion. But here they do not.
Both the AIC and BIC choose p = 1 to be the appropriate lag length. This finding is confirmed by a set of likelihood ratio tests (Sims, 1980) which tell us that a VAR(p > 1) model does not significantly outperform the VAR(1) model. The results of these tests are reported in Table 1 . We continue by estimating a VAR(2) model. The residuals from this model are normally distributed, they do not suffer from serial autocorrelation nor do we detect the presence of ARCH. Thus, we accept p = 2 as the lag length in our VAR model. Table 2 shows that the AIC, BIC, and LR-tests all choose a VAR(2) model as the appropriate model given that we cannot accept a VAR(1) model due to non-normality of the residuals. With p = 2 in hand we can write down the unrestricted VAR (2) model as 
A Joint Test for Cointegration and Model Specification
The VAR(2) model can be rewritten in error-correction form as a VEC(1) model
Testing for cointegration between the nonstationary variables, x, amounts to determining the rank of the matrix π. If the rank of π is zero, then there are no linearly independent combinations of the nonstationary variables which are stationary. Thus, the nonstationary variables are not cointegrated. If the rank of π is two, then the variables themselves are both stationary (and the test for cointegration becomes redundant). If the rank of π is one, then there is one linearly independent combination of the nonstationary variables which is stationary. This means that the nonstationary variables are cointegrated. Thus, we want to test the hypothesis that rank(π) = 1.
The Johansen method requires that we determine the rank of π and test for the presence of deterministic components in the model jointly, since the presence of deterministic components in the model affects the properties of the test for cointegration.
To make these notions more clear, let us start by examining a more general version of the VEC(1) model
where µ sr is a (2 × 1) vector of constants in the short-run model, δ sr is a (2 × 1)
vector of regression coefficients which allow for a deterministic time trend, t, in the short-run model. The matrix π and the vector of variables x t−1 are both modified to allow for the presence of a single constant, µ lr , and a single deterministic time trend, δ lr t, in the long-run model (i.e. in the cointegrating vector). These are denoted as Our task is to identify which of these models fits the data best at the same time as we test for cointegration. We can do this by testing different sets of restrictions jointly with the restriction that the rank of e π is either 0, 1, or 2. We can minimize on the number of tests necessary to complete this task by realizing that neither Model 1 or Model 2 are reasonable representation of the data, since the data trends upwards over time. This trend can be captured in model 3 by allowing for a non-zero drift term in each equation, µ sr . Models 4 and 5 are also reasonable representations of the data. Model 5, however, is the only model which explicitly allows for a quadratic, deterministic trend in the data, which is what we found when we pre-tested the variables. We can also exclude the test for rank(e π) = 2, since both variables are
This leaves us with a set of 6 joint null hypotheses to be tested. These null hypotheses can be ordered from the most restrictive test to the least restrictive test as follows: model 3 ∩ rank(e π) = 0; model 4 ∩ rank(e π) = 0; model 5 ∩ rank(e π) = 0 ; model 3 ∩ rank(e π) = 1; model 4 ∩ rank(e π) = 1; model 5 ∩ rank(e π) = 1. Table 3 shows each of these null hypotheses along with the appropriate likelihood-ratio (trace) test. Critical values taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Four of the six null hypotheses are rejected at the 5 percent significance level.
Although H 0 : model 4 ∩ rank(e π) = 1 is not rejected by the likelihood-ratio test, the residuals from this model trend upwards. As we saw in the pre-tests of the variables, there is a deterministic trend in ∆x t . Model 4 restricts this trend to be zero and, hence, the trend in ∆x t shows up in the residuals. The rank of the estimated e π matrix, b π, is equal to one which means that the long-run model e πe x t−1 is indeed cointegrated. The dual of this result is that there is one common stochastic trend driving the long run model. This stochastic trend is often assumed to be the sum of exogenous domestic productivity and exogenous world market prices (see e.g. Jacobson and Ohlsson, 1994) . The quadratic, deterministic trend can be interpreted as domestic inflation, where the quadratic part is due to the high level of inflation in Sweden during the 1970's and '80's.
Testing Structural Hypotheses
In this section of the paper, we are interested in testing two hypotheses. 
which has an R 2 = 0.54. The residuals are normally distributed and do not suffer from serial autocorrelation or ARCH. Thus we can conclude that ∆w cg t does not Granger cause ∆w ps t . Changes in private sector salaries are determined by a deterministic trend (domestic inflation) and by a stochastic trend (domestic productivity + world market prices) and not by changes in central government salaries.
Testing for Wage Equalization
Testing for long-run convergence in salary levels between sectors amounts to a test The t-value for π 1,1 equals 0.40. So, we can pare down the conditional model of ∆w but stands in stark contrast to two recent papers published by the Swedish Central 14 The estimates of the constant and the linear trend are actually conglomerate estimates of the constants and trends in both the short-run and the long-run conditional model. 15 It is important to keep in mind, however, that the data has in no way been cleansed of potential changes in the composition and characteristics of the two different groups of workers. So, w can not be interpreted as a standard wage premium. 
